I use recent oil and natural gas shale discoveries in the U.S. as a natural experiment to identify the importance of local access to finance for local economic outcomes. Development of shale resources has led to large unexpected personal wealth windfalls, which increase local bank deposits. Higher bank deposits improve a bank's ability to make loans, leading to a positive local credit supply shock. I find that the number of establishments in shale boom counties in industries more dependent on external finance increases 4.7% relative to those less dependent on external finance. Furthermore, the benefit to industries with high dependence on external finance is greater in counties with a higher market share of small banks. These findings suggest that despite deregulation, consolidation, and improved use of information technology in the U.S. banking system, local credit supply and local banking market composition still matter for economic outcomes.
In perfect markets, entrepreneurs and firms should be able to obtain funding for all positive net present value projects. In such a world, changes in the availability of local sources of capital would have no effect on investment or employment. However, if informational, regulatory, or other frictions interfere with the funding of positive net present value projects then suboptimal economic outcomes may occur. Distance can play an important role in aggravating frictions, so the extent to which local access to finance matters, particularly for bank lending, is an indication of how much frictions impede economic activity. In the United States, progress has been made to mitigate frictions and reduce the importance of geographic proximity for bank lending relationships (Berger (2003) ). These advances include state level banking deregulation as well as the use of internet lending and credit score models. In this study, I provide evidence that despite these advances, local credit supply and local banking market composition still matter for local economic outcomes. Documenting a causal relationship between local access to finance and local economic outcomes based on a simple test of correlation is fraught with endogeneity concerns due to omitted variables and reverse-causality issues (Becker 2007) . To resolve endogeneity issues, and identify the influence of local access to finance, I investigate how an exogenous increase in credit supply influences local economic outcomes. Additionally, I provide evidence on whether local banking market composition may cause a region to be more vulnerable to credit constraints.
To empirically identify these issues, I use oil and natural gas shale discoveries ("booms") as a natural experiment. Specifically, I use a unique dataset to observe oil and natural gas shale discoveries and development at the individual well level in the seven U.S. states with significant shale discoveries from 2003 to 2009. Using detailed, well specific data enables me to capture exogenous shocks to local bank deposits and how local economic outcomes respond to these shocks. I find that the exogenous increase in individual mineral wealth associated with shale booms increases local bank deposits by 8.4% in shale boom counties. An increase in bank deposits improves a bank's access to funds, which enhances the bank's ability to make loans.
In order to assess the impact of this credit supply shock on local economic outcomes I focus on how economic outcomes, specifically the number of establishments and employment, vary across different types of industries.
1 Consistent with the view that increased local credit supply improves local economic outcomes, I find that the number of establishments in boom counties in industries with high dependence on external finance increases 4.7% relative to industries with low external finance needs.
If local credit supply does matter, it is important to identify aspects of a local banking market which may make a county particularly susceptible to sub-optimal economic outcomes due to bank funding frictions. Prior research has suggested that smaller banks may be more reliant on deposit funding and have fewer sources of external capital, leading to potential issues for businesses needing credit, and ultimately to worse economic outcomes 2 . I document that firms in counties with a higher market share of small banks are more credit constrained, as these areas benefit disproportionately from credit supply shocks. Specifically, I find that the number of establishments in industries with high dependence on external finance increases 11.1% relative to establishments in industries with low dependence on external finance in boom counties with high small bank market share.
Unexpected improvements in drilling technology in the early 2000s and rising natural gas prices have enabled the development of shale resources to become economically profitable.
These factors have unleashed a wave of prospecting that has resulted in new shale discoveries 1 Since detailed bank level loan data is unavailable, I follow the approach of other studies and focus on economic outcome variables. In results not included in this paper, I confirm that Commercial and Industrial loans increase for banks which experience a shale boom and that have all of their operations in a shale boom county. However, from the Call Report data I cannot tell which industries or firms obtain these loans.
2 Prior research discussing this issue includes Berger et al (2005) , Houston et al (1997) , and Jayaratne and Morgan (2000) each year in different counties across the United States. The prolific and low risk nature of shale wells has led to fierce competition to lease mineral rights from individual mineral owners, as lease agreements must be secured prior to the commencement of drilling operations.
Competition for acreage has caused companies to offer generous upfront payments (known as lease "bonus" payments) and royalty percentages to mineral owners. The development of new shale reserves has resulted in individual mineral owners having hit a "geologic jackpot," often becoming overnight millionaires. This increased individual wealth raises the level of bank deposits, which increases the funds available for a bank to lend, resulting in a positive local credit supply shock.
When a county experiences a shale boom, demand for goods and services from all industries may increase. To isolate the effect of the credit supply shock from the effect of an overall improvement in growth opportunities, I focus on how economic outcomes differ for industries with high dependence on external finance relative to industries with low dependence on external finance. The key identifying assumption of this paper is that demand for goods and services during a boom period do not disproportionately favor industries with high dependence on external finance relative to industries with low dependence on external finance. To this end I have excluded all economic outcome measures (establishments and employment) directly related to oil and gas extraction, construction, real estate, and financial services, as economic outcomes for these industries improve due to reasons unrelated to improved local credit supply.
In order to provide support for my identifying assumption I undertake several additional exercises. Specifically, I demonstrate that the difference in economic outcomes between industry groups is not driven by exposure to economic fluctuations, which I measure as an industry's asset beta. I also demonstrate that my overall results are not dependent on the inclusion or exclusion of any single industry group. Furthermore, the final specifications using market share of small banks are a regression form of differences-in-differences-in-differences, and provide additional support for the initial local credit supply result. The triple differencing is comprised of: 1) boom county/years vs non-boom county/years 2) high external finance dependence industries vs low external finance dependence industries and 3) high small bank market share vs low small bank market share. In order for an alternative explanation to be consistent with the results presented in this paper it would need to explain why high external finance dependent industries benefit more in boom county/years than in non-boom county/years, and why this benefit is greater when there is a higher market share of small banks.
Why might local access to finance matter? One possibility is that local banks may have better information about local business conditions and local firm creditworthiness, which would enable them to make loans in a way that non-local capital can not. However, the influence of distance in worsening informational frictions for non-local lenders has eroded with the improved use of information technology, such as internet lending and credit models (Berger (2003) ). Existing literature has documented that geographic proximity to finance matters less. For example, Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that the distance between lenders and small firms has increased, and that small firms communicate with their lenders less in person. Since the time period of their study, even further strides have been made in the use of technology to alleviate distance related frictions. Alternatively, Becker (2007) studies the U.S. banking system from 1970 to 2000, and using senior citizens as an instrument for local deposit supply, argues a causal link between local deposit supply and local economic outcomes. I extend the existing literature in two important ways. First, I use a new natural experiment to identify the importance of local credit supply for a time period exclusively after the completion of banking deregulation, and which has seen increased use of credit scores and the internet for lending. Second, I document how local banking market composition, specifically market share of small banks, has important implications for economic outcomes.
Both these findings provide new insight on the consequences of informational frictions that remain despite the advances that have been made through banking deregulation, banking consolidation, and the improved use of information technology. The empirical design and results presented in this paper suggest that even in a deregulated and highly developed banking system economically significant frictions still exist, and that regions with a higher market share of small banks may be more vulnerable to these frictions.
In the next section 1 provide an overview of additional related literature. Section 2 provides detail on my identification strategy and background on my natural experiment. Section 3 discusses data and variable definitions. Section 4 discusses results in detail, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Related Literature and Motivation
Improved use of information technology, as well as the deregulation and consolidation of the banking industry have eroded many of the informational and regulatory frictions in the U.S. banking system. This study tests whether frictions remain in the U.S. banking system and how economically significant they are. Additionally, I provide new evidence on characteristics of a local banking market which may cause the frictions that remain to be more problematic for economic outcomes. In particular, this paper documents two sets of frictions, one between borrowers and banks, and another between banks and access to funds for lending.
Recent research has suggested that geography and distance currently play less of a role in enhancing informational frictions between borrowers and banks due to improved use of information technology. Petersen and Rajan (2002) state: "...technology is slowly breaking the tyranny of distance, at least in small business lending." Berger (2003) documents the rise of internet banking, electronic payment technologies, and credit scoring. These technologies would suggest a reduced importance of local access to finance, because borrowers can more easily convey information about themselves to banks that are farther away.
Banking deregulation in U.S. states has affected output growth rates (Jayaratne and Strahan 1996) , the rate of new incorporations (Black and Strahan 2002) , the number of firms and firm-size distribution (Cetorelli and Strahan 2006) , and entrepreneurship (Kerr and Nanda 2009 ). Additionally, Bertrand et al. (2007) document that banking deregulation in France leads to better allocation of bank loans to firms and more restructuring activity. This paper extends this literature by testing the importance of frictions in the U.S. banking system after deregulation. If the U.S. banking system were perfectly integrated post-deregulation then one would expect that a positive local deposit shock should not matter for local economic outcomes, as banks would have been able to obtain funding elsewhere to lend locally.
Small banks and large banks have important differences in organization, funding, and lending (Berger et al. 2005) . Kashyap and Stein (2000) document that monetary policy influences lending for small banks more than for large banks, while Bassett and Brady (2002) document that small banks rely more on deposit funding. Smaller banks also have fewer sources of funding outside a local area (Houston et al. (1997) , Jayaratne and Morgan (2000) , Campello (2002) ). If small banks need to raise capital externally, while large banks can redeploy capital internally across different geographic regions, then areas with more small banks may have more agency and informational issues related to obtaining external funding.
These bank funding frictions may mean that areas with a higher proportion of small banks could be less likely to have access to funding beyond local deposits. Additionally, diversification concerns at small banks may also influence lending. For example, Strahan and Weston (1998) find that the level of small business lending rises monotonically with size and that consolidation of small banks increases bank lending to small businesses. In order for bank funding frictions or diversification concerns to affect real economic outcomes, borrowers must also suffer from distance related frictions which obstruct them from obtaining loans outside their local area. If borrowers do suffer from distance related frictions, areas with a higher proportion of small banks may be expected to benefit more from the credit supply shock caused by a shale boom. This paper is also more broadly related to other papers which use natural experiments to document the importance of access to finance for economic outcomes in different settings earlier in the United States (Peek and Rosengren 2000 , Ashcraft 2005 , Chava and Purnanandam 2011 and internationally (Khwaja and Mian 2008 , Iyer and Peydro 2010 , Schnabl 2011 , Paravisini 2008 ). This paper complements this literature by focusing on a developed market after banking deregulation. In other related work, Guiso et al (2004) use Italian data to document the importance of financial development on new firm entry, competition, and growth. Recent literature has also used natural experiments in the U.S. to document the importance of local access to finance for productivity (Butler and Cornaggia 2011) and riskmanagement (Cornaggia 2011) . Additionally, Plosser (2011) uses a similar setting as this paper, but focuses on bank capital allocation decisions. My contribution differs from these papers in that I present evidence on the importance of a local banking market characteristic, specifically small bank market share, that makes financing frictions more problematic for economic outcomes in a region.
Identification Strategy: Unexpected Development of Natural Gas Shale

A. Natural Gas Shale Industry Background
The advent of natural gas shale development is one of the single biggest changes in the U.S. energy landscape in the last 20 years. According to the U.S. Energy Information Agency, in its 2011 Annual Energy Outlook, there are 827 Trillion Cubic Feet (Tcf) of technically recoverable unproved shale gas reserves in the United States, this estimate is a 72% upward revision from the previous year. 827 Tcf of natural gas is enough to fulfill all of the United States' natural gas consumption for 36 years. On an energy equivalent basis 827 Tcf represents 20 years of total U.S. oil consumption or 42 years of U.S. motor gasoline consumption.
As recently as the late 1990s, these reserves were not thought to be economically profitable to develop, and represented less than 1% of U.S. natural gas production. However, the development of the first major natural gas shale "play" in the United States, the Barnett Shale in and around Fort Worth, TX, changed industry notions on the viability of natural gas shale.
In the early 1980s Mitchell Energy drilled the first well in the Barnett Shale (Yergin 2011). However, rather than encountering the typical, highly porous, rock of conventional formations, Mitchell encountered natural gas shale. Shale has the potential to hold vast amounts of gas, however, it is highly non-porous which causes the gas to be trapped in the rock. Over a period of 20 years Mitchell Energy experimented with different techniques, and found that by using hydraulic fracturing (commonly referred to as "fracking") it was able to break apart the rock to free natural gas. With higher natural gas prices and the combination of horizontal drilling with "fracking" in 2002, large new reserves from shale became economically profitable to produce. Continued development of drilling and hydraulic fracturing techniques have enabled even more production efficiencies, and today shale wells have an extremely low risk of being unproductive (unproductive wells are commonly referred to as "dry-holes").
The low risk of dry-holes and high production rates have led to a land grab for mineral leases which were previously passed over. Prior to initiating drilling activities a firm must first negotiate with a mineral owner to lease the right to develop minerals. Typically these contracts are comprised of a large upfront payment, which is paid whether the well is productive or not, and a royalty percentage based on the value of the gas produced over time. Across the U.S., communities have experienced significant fast-paced mineral booms.
For example, the New Orleans ' Times-Picayune (2008) reports the rise of bonus payments in the Haynesville Shale, which increased from a few hundred dollars an acre to $10,000 to $30,000 an acre plus 25% royalty in a matter of a year. An individual who owns one square mile of land (640 acres) and leases out his minerals at $30,000/acre would receive an upfront one-time payment of $19.2 million plus a monthly payment equal to 25% of the value of all the gas produced on his lease. The media has dubbed those lucky enough to have been sitting on shale mineral leases as "shalionaires." The significant personal windfalls people have experienced in natural gas shale booms has led to increases in bank deposits in the communities that they live in. Since the first major shale boom in the Barnett (TX), additional booms have occurred in the Woodford (OK), Fayetteville (AR), Haynesville (LA + TX), Marcellus (PA + WV), Bakken (Oil ND), and Eagleford (TX).
B. Identification Strategy
The booms experienced by communities across the U.S. due to shale discoveries are exogenous to the underlying characteristics of the affected communities (health, education, demographics etc). The exogenous factors driving shale development include technological breakthroughs (horizontal drilling/hydraulic fracturing) and larger macroeconomic forces (demand for natural gas and natural gas prices). Acknowledging the unexpected nature of shale gas development John Watson, CEO of Chevron, stated in a Wall Street Journal (2011) interview, that the technological advances associated with "fracking" took the industry "by surprise." The development of shale discoveries is typically undertaken by large publicly traded exploration and production companies that obtain financing from financial markets outside of the local area of the discovery. The exogenous nature of a shale boom and the effect it has on local deposit supply creates an attractive setting for a natural experiment, which I use to identify the importance of local credit supply and local banking market composition. In order to track shale development I use a unique data set which has detailed information on the time and place (county-year) of drilling activity associated with shale booms. 
B.1. Effect of Boom on Deposits
The first step in my analysis is to quantify the deposit shock observed in Figure 1 for the entire sample. Specifically what is the impact of a shale boom on local deposit supply? In order to do this I estimate the following regression model
Boom i,t is a measure of shale activity, in my tests I use both log total number of horizontal wells (which are used to develop shale reserves), and a binary dummy boom variable to measure the shale boom. LogDeposit i,t is the logarithm of deposits summed across all branches in county i at time t. LogP op i,t is included as a control and is the logarithm of the population of county i at time t. County fixed effects are included to control for time invariant county effects and year effects are included to account for time-varying effects, these enter the specification in the form of Y earF E t (year fixed effect) and CountyF E i (county fixed effect). The key variable of interest in this specification is the coefficient β 2 , which indicates the change in LogDeposit i,t attributable to the Boom i,t variable.
B.2. Effect of Boom on Economic Outcomes: Differences-in-Differences
In order to identify the economic outcomes due to the local credit supply shock, it is necessary to use a regression specification which distinguishes between economic outcomes for industries with a high dependence on external finance and industries with a low dependence on external finance. To achieve this aim, I use a regression form of differences-in-differences, where the first difference(β 2 ) can be thought of as the difference in economic outcomes between boom county/years and non-boom county/years. To identify the effect of the credit component of a boom I incorporate a second difference (β 3 ), the difference in economic outcomes for industries with high dependence on external finance and industries with low dependence on external finance.
Where EconomicOutcome i,j,t is an economic outcome measure for county i and industry group j at time t. The results in this paper use the logarithm of establishments, establishments per capita, and logarithm of employment as the economic outcome measures. Due to the low number of establishments in different industries at the county level, I have grouped establishments into two industry types: one industry group which has a high dependence on external finance, for which High j = 1 and one industry group with low dependence on external finance High j = 0. 4 . Thus, for every county I have only two industry groups, which are delineated by dependence on external finance. I also include two sets of fixed effects. IndustryT rendsF E j,t controls for time-varying differences in industry growth, while
CountyIndustryF E i,j controls for county specific differences in industry make-up. 5 .
This specification is a regression form of differences-in-differences, with the key variable of interest being the coefficient on the interaction term, β 3 . If industries with a high dependence on external finance benefit more from shale booms, β 3 would be positive, which would indicate the importance of the credit supply component of a boom. 6 Alternatively, if local access to finance did not influence local economic outcomes, β 3 would be zero. That is, while the boom may benefit all industries through the coefficient β 2 (overall increased demand for goods and services), there would be no evidence that the credit supply component of a boom enhances local economic outcomes.
B.3. Effect of Boom on Economic Outcomes: Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences
In order to test whether the reliance of smaller banks on deposits is problematic for local economic outcomes I undertake a triple differencing specification. The first two differences are the same as the previous section: non-boom county/years vs. boom county/years, high dependence on external finance vs. low dependence on external finance. The third difference tests whether the effect from the first two differences is bigger in areas with a higher small bank market share: high small bank market share vs. low small bank market share. To measure small bank market share, SmallBank, I use both the proportion of branches in a county which belong to small banks as well as a dummy variable for the counties which are in the highest quartile of small bank branch market share in any given year. The interaction of SmallBank i,t with the other terms in the differences-in-differences specification enables me to construct a regression form of differences-in-differences-in-differences below. 7 .
In this regression the key variable of interest is β 7 . If industries with higher dependence on the non-bank channels being available 7 High j is not included in the regression because this variable is subsumed by the county-industry fixed effects, CountyIndustryF E i,j external finance benefit more in boom counties that have a high small bank market share this coefficient would be positive. • Boom Dummy i,t = A dummy variable set to 1 if county i at time t is in the top quartile of all county-years with horizontal well activity (total horizontal wells > 17)
Data and Variable Definition
in the panel dataset. Once the variable is set to 1, all subsequent years in the panel for the county are set to 1.
Regressions are based on the total horizontal wells drilled for the year leading up through
March. This corresponds to when the County Business Pattern Data are tabulated. Summary statistics on sample states, counties, and well data are presented in Table 1 . Figure 2 presents a map of the intensity and location of shale development activity.
B. Deposit and Bank Data
Deposit and bank data are obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Table 2 . Table 10 my results remain similar and statistically significant when any of these industries are included.
C. County Level Economic Outcome Data by Industry
10
After matching County Business Pattern data with Compustat external finance dependence measures, I aggregate all industry codes into two industry groups, one with above median dependence on external finance (high) and one with below median dependence on external finance (low). 11 The two digit NAICS code from the County Business Patterns data is used to obtain an external finance dependence measure from Compustat, which is described in more detail in the next subsection. The objective of the matching is to have the cleanest sorting of NAICS codes into high external finance dependence and low external finance dependence bins. Details on the industries in these bins, are provided in Table 3 .
While the County Business Patterns Survey provides detailed data on establishment counts by industry, employment data may be suppressed, for privacy reasons, if there are too few establishments in a particular industry. Employment data suppression is a particular problem for counties with smaller populations, for this reason the number of observations in employment regressions is reduced. Furthermore, this suppression of employment data makes including employment in the regressions related to small bank market share problematic, as 62% of establishments in high small bank market share counties have employment reporting suppressed.
D. External Finance Dependence Measures
I use an external finance dependence measure similar to the measure used by Rajan and 10 Using three digit NAICS code industries poses two problems 1) There are 71 industries as opposed to 14, so there are far fewer comparable Compustat firms for some industries 2) There was a change in industry categorization that occurred in [2002] [2003] , which creates problems when constructing a pre-boom control period for booms that occur in 2003 and 2004. 11 The reason for this aggregation, as opposed to using more detailed county-industry data is that many industries are absent from many counties so there would be significant issues with missing data if I were to use detailed county-industry data.
Zingales (1998). The main difference is that while they use this measure only for manufacturing firms, I use it for all industry groups similar to Becker (2007) 
I take the median of this measure to get an industry's external finance dependence. The calculation of this measure for each industry is displayed in Table 3 . One concern may be that deposits could be rising in anticipation of a boom, or that there could be some spurious correlation in a county during part of the boom period which is causing the result in Table 4 . In order to test the precise timing of the boom relative to deposit growth I replace the Boom Dummy variable used in Table 4 include a set of dummies for each year relative to a boom from t − 6 to t + 3. Due to limited observations beyond t + 3, I group any observations after t + 3 with the t + 3 dummy (3+). Table 5 provides the results of the effect of a shale boom on log establishments, establishments per capita, and log employment, these results are for both industry types (high external finance dependent and low external finance dependent). The economic interpretation of the results in column (1) is that the establishment levels of all industries increases by 2.3% in a county when there is a boom, while the economic interpretation of (3) is that establishments per capita increase 1.82 per 10,000 people when there is a boom. The result reported in column (5) indicates that employment increases across all industries by 2.7%
Results
A. Deposit Levels in Boom Counties
B. Economic Outcomes and Shale Booms
when there is a boom.
However, demand for goods and services for all establishments may increase when there is a boom, so it is not surprising to see the results in Table 5 . In order to draw a more direct causal relationship between the credit supply component of a boom and economic outcomes, it is necessary to look at the difference between outcomes for industries with a high dependence on external finance compared to those with low dependence on external finance. In Table 6 I run the regression specification in Table 5 on each industry group separately. The larger magnitude of coefficients in the regressions for industries more dependent on external finance (Ind = High) suggest that the industries in this industry group benefit more from a boom. Specifically, the coefficients from (1) and (2) of Table 6 can be interpreted as a 5.9%
increase in high external finance dependent establishments when a boom occurs relative to a 0% increase in low external finance dependent establishments.
There may be some concerns as to the timing of the boom and changes in local economic outcomes. If we take establishment levels as an example, if establishment levels of low external finance dependent establishments and high external finance dependent establishments trend differently prior to the boom, they may be poor control/treatment groups. Additionally, if external finance dependent establishments trend higher well before the boom, it would suggest a problem with my empirical design, as the deposit levels in Figure 3 do not increase until time 0. In order to directly assess the validity of these concerns I construct a graph similar to Figure 3 , but for establishments. Specifically, for each of the industry groups I run the regressions in (1) and (2) of Table 6 , but replace the Boom variable with a set of dummy variables based on the time period of an observation relative to a boom for any given county i (similar to what is done in Figure 3 ). The coefficients from this regression are graphed for each industry group in Figure 4 . As can be seen, from time t-6 to t-1, each industry group tracks relatively closely, then at time 0, the first year of a boom, there is a divergence in trends, which increases through t+3. This suggests that when the boom occurs, establishments in high external finance dependent industries benefit disproportionately more compared to low external finance dependent industries. The evidence presented in Figure   4 should serve to ease concerns regarding the change in establishment levels relative to the precise timing of a boom. The results outlined in Table 6 and Figure 4 can be formalized in a regression form of differences-in-differences. Table 7 provides a direct test of the evidence presented in Table 6 and Figure 4 in a regression form of differences-in-differences. The coefficient of interest for assessing whether improved local credit supply plays a role in local economic outcomes is the interaction term Boom i,t * High j . The sign and magnitude of this term indicates whether one industry group benefits disproportionately when there is a boom. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant in all specifications, suggesting that local economic outcomes for high dependence on external finance industries benefit more than outcomes for industries with low dependence on external finance. The economic interpretation of the interaction coefficient in (1) of Table 7 is that, when there is a boom, establishments in industries with high dependence on external finance increase 4.7% relative to establishments in industries with low dependence on external finance. To put this number in context, the average annual increase in high external finance dependent establishments from 2000 to 2009 is 0.9%.
However, as suggested earlier, it is likely that local financial market composition may play a role in the economic magnitude of improved local access to finance. Specifically, counties with a higher small bank market share may benefit more from additional local deposits.
To test this in the differences-in-differences framework, I subdivide counties into high small bank market share and low small bank market share counties, based on whether a county is in the top quartile of small bank market share in a given year. I run the specification presented in Table 7 for each of these subgroups, and present the results in Table 8 .
In every specification the small bank market share subgroup has a higher coefficient for the interaction term Boom i,t * High j . The magnitude of differences is often quite large, with high small bank market share counties (Bank = High Small Bank Mkt Share) having coefficients ranging from 3 times to 5 times low small bank market share counties (Bank = Low Small Bank Mkt Share), depending on the specification. 12 In order to address concerns regarding anticipation and spurious timing correlations, I graph the interaction coefficients as in Figure 4 , but for each bank market share subgroup in Figure 5 . As can be seen, both county groups trend similarly until time 0, when both groups diverge, with the divergence increasing through time t+3.
To formally test the results in Table 8 and Figure 5 , I run a regression form of differencesin-differences-in-differences, with the results shown in Table 9 . This is done by adding additional interactions with small bank market share variables. The coefficient of interest in these tests is the triple interaction term Boom i,t * SmallBank i,t * High j . A positive coefficient on the triple interaction term indicates that high external finance dependent industries benefit more when there is a boom in an area with high small bank market share. Specifically, the interpretation of (1) in Table 9 is that high external finance dependent establishments increase by 11.1% relative to establishments in industries with low dependence on external finance in boom counties with high small bank market share. Across all specifications the coefficient on Boom i,t * SmallBank i,t * High j is positive and statistically significant, providing formal evidence that higher small bank market share counties were funding constrained prior to the boom. Specifically, if there were no frictions on a bank's funding side, additional deposits from the boom should not disproportionately benefit high external finance dependent industries in high small bank market share counties. Therefore, these results suggest a specific banking market characteristic, high market share of small banks, which may make counties more vulnerable to frictions post-deregulation.
The results in Table 9 also alleviate concerns regarding alternative explanations from the prior differences-in-differences tests conducted. The key identifying assumption of this paper is that high external finance dependent industries should not disproportionately benefit from a boom for a reason other than the credit supply component of a boom. For example, it could be the case that high external finance dependent industries benefit more in general when there is an economic boom (high asset beta perhaps), however, this explanation would not account for the differential impact experienced in high small bank market share counties relative to low small bank market share counties. An additional concern may be that there could be more demand for goods and services for industries in the high external finance dependence industry group. However, in order for this explanation to be consistent with the results in Table 9 , there would also need to be a rationale for why this demand differential is relatively bigger in counties with high small bank market share. In summary, the results in Table 9 provide added robustness for the initial differences-in-differences tests, while also suggesting a characteristic of local banking markets, high market share of small banks, which make an area more exposed to frictions in the current U.S. banking system.
C. Sensitivity of Results to Industries
The key identification assumption of this paper is that local economic outcomes for industries more dependent on external finance should not improve relative to outcomes for industries less dependent on external finance for some reason other than improved access to local finance. The differences-in-differences-in-differences tests help rule out several alternative explanations, however, a secondary test of this identifying assumption is included in Table 10 . Specifically, for each industry group I calculate a measure of exposure to underlying economic fluctuations, asset beta, using two different asset beta methodologies.
The asset betas used are industry median asset betas. If it is the case that the asset betas for each industry group are different it could be cause for concern, as this would mean one industry group would be more sensitive to overall fluctuations in an economy. The results in Panel A of Table 10 provide evidence that the high external finance dependent industry group does have a higher asset beta. However, when the two highest asset beta industry groups are dropped from the regressions causing both industry groups to have similar asset betas, as in Panel B of Table 10 , the interaction and triple interaction coefficients from the differences-in-differences regression and differences-in-differences-in-differences regression are still positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the difference in underlying asset betas between the groups is not driving the overall results. Additionally Table 10 provides evidence that the regression results presented in Table 7 and Table 9 are not being driven by any single industry group, and either its inclusion (Panel A (3) and (4)) or exclusion (Panel C (3) and (4)) in the study.
D. Falsification Tests
An additional concern may be whether the booms are anticipated, or whether the timing of actual shale development coincides with the changes in local economic outcomes documented in this paper. To directly test whether any of the local economic outcome changes begin prior to a boom, I include dummy variables for the two years prior to the first shale development. These enter the regressions in the form of the F alseBoom variable. As can be seen in the results in Table 11 , neither the F alseBoom variable, nor any of the interaction variables are statistically significant. This result provides direct evidence that the changes in economic outcome variables documented in this paper do not occur before the onset of shale development activity.
Conclusion
The United States has one of the most developed banking systems in the world. Prior research has demonstrated that integration, deregulation, and consolidation have led to improved economic outcomes. However, this paper provides new evidence that, despite improvements, economically significant frictions still remain in the U.S. banking system. In order to document the economic magnitudes of these frictions, and obtain identification, I use oil and gas shale booms as a natural experiment. Specifically, I find that when a boom occurs, bank deposits increase and, as a consequence economic outcomes for industries with high dependence on external finance improve relative to industries with low dependence on external finance, suggesting that local credit supply matters for economic outcomes.
I also document that local banking market composition, specifically market share of small banks, can leave some areas more vulnerable to post-deregulation frictions. Consistent with the view that small banks may be more funding constrained, and that this influences local economic outcomes, I find that economic outcomes for industries with high dependence on external finance improve more in shale boom counties with a high market share of small banks. This suggests that deregulation, consolidation, and increased use of information technology have not fully alleviated economically important frictions in the U.S. banking industry, and that local banking market composition still matters for economic outcomes. Pre-Boom Post-Boom Figure 3 Deposit Levels Before and After Shale Boom: This figure plots the regression of dummy variables based on the year relative to a boom. The first year of a boom is year 0, and the definition of boom that is used is Boom Dummy (previously defined). For example, the first point is the plot of a dummy variable for time t-6 relative to the boom. Due to limited observations for times greater than t+3, all observations after time t+3 are grouped with the t+3 dummy (3+). The dependent variable is the logarithm of total deposits in the county, so the coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in the level of deposits at different points in time relative to the boom. The logarithm of population, year fixed effects, and county fixed effects were included in the regression as well. This figure plots separately the regression coefficients of dummy variables of the year relative to a boom for industries with high dependence on external finance and low dependence on external finance. The first year of a boom is year 0, and the definition of boom that is used is Boom Dummy(previously defined). For example, the first point is the plot of a dummy variable for time t-6 relative to the boom. Due to limited observations for times greater than t+3, all observations after time t+3 are grouped with the t+3 dummy (3+). The dependent variable is logarithm of establishments in an industry in a county, so the coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in establishment levels at different points in time relative to the boom. The logarithm of population, year fixed effects, and county fixed effects were included in the regression as well. For example, the first point is the plot of the interaction term for time t-6 relative to the boom. Due to limited observations for times greater than t+3, all observations after time t+3 are grouped with the t+3 dummy (3+). The first year of a boom is year 0, and the definition of boom that is used is Boom Dummy (previously defined). The definition of High Small Bank Market Share is counties that are in the top quartile of small bank (<$500 Million in Assets) market share. The dependent variable is logarithm of establishments in an industry in a county, so the coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in high external finance dependent establishments relative to low external finance dependent establishments at different points in time relative to the boom. The logarithm of population, industry-year (industry trends) fixed effects, and county-industry fixed effects were included in the regression as well. This table contains summary statistics for the data used in the panel regressions. The unit of observation for economic outcome variables in the panel is at the county-year-industry (external finance industry group) level, while the unit of observation for bank deposits is at the county-year level. Data on establishments and employment are from the County Business Patterns survey. Economic outcome variables are summed across all industries into two groups based on an industry's dependence on external finance. Hence for each county-year there are two industry groups, one with high dependence on external finance and one with low dependence on external finance. Data on annual population levels are from the Census Bureau Small Banks are defined to be banks with less than $500 million in Obs Mean Std Dev
Deposit Variable
based on an industry's dependence on external finance. Hence for each county-year there are two industry groups, one with high dependence on external finance and one with low dependence on external finance. Data on annual population levels are from the Census Bureau. Small Banks are defined to be banks with less than $500 million in assets, adjusted for inflation (year 2000 dollars). Bank data was compiled from the FDIC summary of deposit reports. Horizontal well information is based on well data obtained from Smith International Inc. This table reports the industry groups used in this study. The industry groups are based on the two digit North American Industry Classification System used in the reporting of the County Business Patterns survey, which is reported annually by the Census Bureau. For each industry a measure of dependence on external finance is calculated, based on the method used by Rajan and Zingales (1998). The external dependence measure reported for each industry is the industry median dependence on external finance. The data used to calculate the external finance dependence measure is from Compustat for the period from 1999 to 2008. The economic outcome measures used, establishments and employment, are aggregated into two separate industry groups in each county, one with high dependence on external finance (External Dependence Flag = 1), and one with low dependence on external finance (External Dependence Flag = 0). The dependent variable in these regressions is the log of total deposits in county i in year t. The explanatory variables are different shale boom variables, which have previously been defined. Log of county population is included as a control, as are county and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county, with tstatistics reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates, where * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Dependent Variable = Log Deposits statistics reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates, where * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. (1-2) is log of establishments, in (3-4) it is establishments per capita (per 10,000 people), and in (5-6) it is log of employment. The explanatory variables are different shale boom variables, which have previously been defined. These tests contain results for both low dependence on external finance and high dependence on external finance industry groups together (Industry = All). Log of county population is also included as a control, as are county-industry and industry-year (industry trends) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county, with t-statistics reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates, where * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Boom =Dummy Boom = Log Total Horizontal Wells Boom =Dummy Boom = Log Total Horizontal Wells Boom =Dummy Boom = Log Total Horizontal Wells Industry = All Industry = All Industry = All Industry = All Industry = All Industry = All Economic Outcome = Log Establishments Economic Outcome = Est Per Capita Economic Outcome = Log Employment (Industry = All). Log of county population is also included as a control, as are county-industry and industry-year (industry trends) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county, with t-statistics reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates, where * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
EconomicOutcome i,j,t = α + β 1 LogPopulation i,t + β 2 Boom i,t + IndustryTrends FE j,t + CountyIndustry FE i,j + ε i,j,t Industry All Industry All Industry All Industry All Industry All Industry All (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) This table reports the results of regressions measuring the effect of a shale boom on different industry groups, one which has high dependence on external finance (Ind = High) and one which has low dependence on external finance (Ind = Low). The dependent variable in these regressions is different measures of economic outcomes in county i, year t, industry group j, specifically log of establishments is used in (1-4) , establishments per capita (per 10,000 people) in (5-8), and log of employment is used in (9-12). Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11) contain results just for industries with High dependence on external finance; Columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10), and (12) contain results just for industries with Low dependence on external finance. Log of county population is also included as a control, as are county-industry and industry-year (industry trends) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county, with t-statistics reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates, where * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
EconomicOutcome i j t = α + β 1 LogPopulation i t + β 2 Boom i t + IndustryTrends FE j t + CountyIndustry FE i j + ε i j t Ind = High Ind = Low Ind = High Ind = Low Ind = High Ind = Low Ind = High Ind = Low Ind = High Ind = Low Ind = High Ind = Low (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) This table reports the results of a regression form of differences-in-differences. The first difference is boom county-years vs. non-boom county-years, while the second difference is industries with high dependence on external finance vs. low dependence on external finance. The dependent variable in these regressions is different measures of economic outcomes in county i, year t, industry group j, specifically log of establishments is used in (1-2), establishments per capita (per 10,000 people) in (3-4), and log of employment is used in (5-6). The interaction term between boom variables and the "High" external finance dependent dummy is the main differences-in-differences coefficient of interest. Log of county population is also included as a control, as are county-industry and industry-year (industry trends) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county, with t-statistics reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates, where * indicates significance at the 10% Boom = Dummy Boom = Log Total Horizontal Wells Boom = Dummy Boom = Log Total Horizontal Wells Boom = Dummy Boom = Log Total Horizontal Wells
Economic Outcome = Log Establishments Economic Outcome = Est Per Capita Economic Outcome = Log Employment people) in (3-4), and log of employment is used in (5-6). The interaction term between boom variables and the "High" external finance dependent dummy is the main differences-in-differences coefficient of interest. Log of county population is also included as a control, as are county-industry and industry-year (industry trends) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county, with t-statistics reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates, where * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Note: A coefficient for High j is not included separately, because it is subsumed by CountyIndustry FE i,j . This table reports a regression form of differences-in-differences for two different county groups, one county group which has high small bank market share (Bank = High Small Bank Mkt Share), and one county group with low small bank market share (Bank = Low Small Bank Mkt Share). The definition of small bank in these regressions is any bank with less than $500 million in assets adjusted for inflation. For this regression high small bank market share counties are defined to be counties in the top quartile of small bank branch market share. The dependent variable in these regressions is different measures of economic outcomes in county i, year t, industry group j, specifically log of establishments is used in (1-4) and establishments per capita (per 10,000 people) in (5-8).
Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) present results for high small bank market share; Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) present results for low small bank market share. The explanatory variables are different shale boom variables, which have previously been defined. Additionally, an interaction between boom variables and the "High" external finance dependence dummy is included, this is the differences-in-differences coefficient of interest (β 3 ). Log of county population is Economic Outcome = Establishments Per Capita Boom = Dummy Boom = Log Total Horizontal Wells Boom = Dummy Boom = Log Total Horizontal Wells Economic Outcome = Log Establishments outcomes in county i, year t, industry group j, specifically log of establishments is used in (1-4) and establishments per capita (per 10,000 people) in (5-8).
Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) present results for high small bank market share; Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) present results for low small bank market share. The explanatory variables are different shale boom variables, which have previously been defined. Additionally, an interaction between boom variables and the "High" external finance dependence dummy is included, this is the differences-in-differences coefficient of interest (β 3 ). Log of county population is also included as a control, as are county-industry and industry-year (industry trends) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county, with t-statistics reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates, where * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Note: A coefficient for High j is not included separately, because it is subsumed by CountyIndustry FE i,j . for a regression form of differences-in-differences-in-differences, where the coefficient of interest is the triple interaction term. The dependent variable in these regressions is different measures of economic outcomes in county i, year t, industry group j, specifically log of establishments is used in (1-4) and establishments per capita (per 10,000 people) in (5-8). The explanatory variables are different boom variables, which have previously been defined. The definition of small bank in these regressions is any bank with less than $500 million in assets adjusted for inflation. These specifications provide results for two different measures of small bank market share. One measure is a dummy variable, set to 1 if a county is in the highest quartile of small bank branch market share in any given year and 0 otherwise (Small Bank Share = Dummy), while the other measure is the ratio of branches which belong to small banks relative to the total number of bank branches in a county (Small Bank Share = Ratio). Additionally, a set of fully saturated interactions between Boom variables, Small Bank Share variables, and the High external finance dependence dummy are included. The key coefficient of interest for the differences-indifferences-in-differences regression is the triple interaction term β 7 . Log of county population is also included as a control, as are county-industry and industry-year (industry trends) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by county, with t-statistics reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates, where * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Note: A coefficient for High j is not included separately, because it is subsumed by CountyIndustry FE i,j . This panel reports regression results of the key interaction coefficients of interest when excluding specific industries from the regression results originally reported in Table 7 (column (2)) and Table 9 (column (3)). The definition of Boom variable used in these regressions is log total horizontal wells, and the definition of Small Bank Share is a dummy variable for counties in the highest quartile of small bank branch market share. Additionally this table reports the asset beta for each industry, using two different methodologies.
Panel B:
This panel reports regression results of the key interaction coefficients of interest when excluding the two highest asset beta industries from the regression results originally reported in Table 7 (column (2)) and Table 9 (column (3)). The definition of Boom variable used in these regressions is log total horizontal wells, and the definition of Small Bank Share is a dummy variable for counties in the highest quartile of small bank branch market share. Columns (6) and (7) report the average asset beta for each industry group when the two highest asset beta industry groups are excluded.
Panel C:
This panel reports regression results of the key interaction coefficients of interest when including the industries which had been excluded from previous regressions due to the direct impact of shale booms on their businesses. The definition of Boom variable used in these regressions is log total horizontal wells, and the definition of Small Bank Share is a dummy variable for counties in the highest quartile of small bank branch market share. Tables 7 and 9 . Specifically, dummy variables are inserted for the two years prior to the beginning of horizontal well activity. The dependent variable in these regressions is different measures of economic outcomes in county i, year t, industry group j, specifically log of establishments is used in (1-2) and establishments per capita (per 10,000 people) in (3-4). Standard errors are clustered by county, with t-statistics reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates, where * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Note: A coefficient for High j is not included separately, because it is subsumed by CountyIndustry FE i,j .
(1) and (3) 
